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Abstract. The characteristic novelty of what is generally meant by a
“physical unclonable function” (PUF) is precisely defined, in order to
supply a firm basis for security evaluations and the proposal of new
security mechanisms. A PUF is defined as a hardware device which im-
plements a physical function with an output value that changes with its
argument. A PUF can be clonable, but a secure PUF must be unclon-
able.
This proposed meaning of a PUF is cleanly delineated from the closely re-
lated concepts of “conventional unclonable function”, “physically obfus-
cated key”,“random-number generator”, “controlled PUF” and “strong
PUF”. The structure of a systematic security evaluation of a PUF en-
abled by the proposed formal definition is outlined. Practically all current
and novel physical (but not conventional) unclonable physical functions
are PUFs by our definition. Thereby the proposed definition captures
the existing intuition about what is a PUF and remains flexible enough
to encompass further research.
In a second part we quantitatively characterize two classes of PUF secu-
rity mechanisms, the standard one, based on a minimum secret read-out
time, and a novel one, based on challenge-dependent erasure of stored
information. The new mechanism is shown to allow in principle the con-
struction of a “quantum-PUF”, that is absolutely secure while not re-
quiring the storage of an exponentially large secret. The construction
of a PUF that is mathematically and physically unclonable in principle
does not contradict the laws of physics.
1 Introduction
1.1 Aims and outline of this work
“Physical unclonable functions” (PUFs) are electronic hardware devices that
are hard to reproduce and can be uniquely identified [14,8]. They promise to
enable qualitatively novel security mechanisms (see e.g. [2,9,10]) and have con-
sequently become a “hot topic” in hardware security[5]. The present work asks
the question “What characteristics exactly define the qualitative novelty of the
PUF concept?”. We hope that a precise answer will aid the security evaluation
of existing PUFs and help to develop new ideas for PUF security mechanisms.
We searched for
21. a formal definition of the properties that are required from a hardware device
to be called “PUF”, and a
2. a formal definition of the criteria that have to be fulfilled to consider a PUF
“unclonable”.
The formal PUF definition should not suffer from weaknesses of previous defi-
nitions (see section 1.2), encompass at least the large majority of the existing
PUF constructions, and be as flexible as possible, i.e. does not restrict further
progress in PUF development (e.g. by demanding constructional details, like
the amount of stored information). This aim is achieved in section 2.1. After
formulating a simple definition of PUF-security (based on Armknecht et al.[1])
in section 2.2 we delineate PUFs from some closely related security concepts
(section 3) and outline the elements of a PUF-security evaluation (section 4).
In a second part of the paper we systematically analyse and classify PUF secu-
rity mechanisms and calculate their quantitative security levels against attacks
that attempt mathematical cloning (section 5). The aims of this section are
to give a quantitative answer to Maes & Verbauwhede’s[13] question whether
mathematically-unclonable PUFs are possible in principle, and to apply and
thereby illustrate the PUF-definitions of the first part of the paper. In section 6
we characterise the qualitative novelty of PUFs as a new primitive of physical
cryptography and discuss the future use and development of PUFs.
1.2 Previous work on the definition of a PUF
There have already been several proposal for the first definition of required PUF
properties. Gassend et al.[8] who invented the term “PUF” (earlier work by
Pappu was on the slightly different concept of a physical one-way function[14])
demand that the function must be “easy to evaluate”, i.e. it must efficiently
yield a response value “R” for a challenge argument “C”. and “hard to predict
(characterize)”. The latter property means that an attacker who has obtained a
polynomial number of C – R pairs (CRPs) but has no longer physical access to
the PUF can only extract a negligible amount of information about the R for a
random C. Ru¨hrmair et al.[15] criticised this definition because the information
content of finite physical objects is always polynomially bound, and therefore
no PUF fulfilling this definition can exist. They propose an alternative formal
definition in which the PUF must only be hard to predict for an attacker “who
may execute any physical operation allowed by the current stage of technology”.
Maes & Verbauwhede[13] chose to exclude unpredictability from their “least
common property subset” of PUFs, because they put into question whether it
is possible in principle to construct a mathematically unclonable PUF. They
demand that a PUF is “easy to evaluate” (property “evaluatable”) and that
it is “reproducible”, meaning that a C always leads to the same R within a
small error. Moreover they demand “physical unclonability” i.e. that it must be
“hard” for an attacker to construct a device that reproduces the behaviour of
the PUF. However, PUFs that are mathematically clonable are also physically
clonable because the mathematical algorithm for PF can then be implemented
3on a device that is then a functional physical clone of the PUF. Summarizing,
a first generation of definitions roughly defined PUFs to be devices that are
efficiently evaluatable and are mathematically and physically unclonable. They
remain unsatisfactory for two reasons:
1. Most of the devices currently called PUFs do not fulfill these definitions
(according to Ru¨hrmair et al.[15] there are only some “candidates”), i.e. the
definition does evidently not really capture the PUF concept.
2. They combine the definition of a PUF with the definition of its security,
i.e. points 1. and 2. above. A PUF is defined by its unclonability i.e. its
security against attacks. This is problematic because an open-ended security
analysis of a PUF clearly must have an “insecure PUF” as one a priori
possible outcome. Based on the above definitions an “insecure PUF” is a
paradox, PUFs would be secure by definition.
These two problems were elegantly solved in a seminal paper by Armknecht et
al.[1] who propose to formalize a PUF as “physical function (“PF”) - which
is a physical device that maps bit-string-challenges “C” to bit-string-responses
“R”. The unclonability is recognized by Armknecht et al. as only one crucial
security property, that they further formally define in great detail. We will sup-
ply a simplified version of their general security definition in section 2.2 below.
Following Armknecht et al., the PUF definition 1. consists in an answer to the
question: What are the required characteristics of PF() in order to be a PUF?
Armknecht et al. do not demand any specific mathematical properties but only
that a PF is a “probabilistic procedure” that maps a set of challenges to a set of
responses and that internally PF is a combination of a physical component and
an evaluation procedure that creates a response. Armknecht et al. explain that
the responses rely heavily on the properties of the physical component but also
on uncontrollable random noise (hence “probabilistic”). This definition of PF()
still faces the following problem:
– Consider a standard authentication chip with a stored secret in a physically
protected memory that calculates a response from the challenge and the se-
cret. Such a chip must contain a “physical component” (the memory) and
an evaluation procedure (its read-out) that fulfills Armknecht et al.’s defini-
tion because some (very small) uncontrollable random noise is unavoidable
even in standard computer memories. There is also no reason why a well
designed standard authentication chip cannot posess Armknecht et al.’s se-
curity properties.
Therefore, even though Armknecht et al.’s definitions constitute great progress
of lasting value, they still do not capture the distinctive properties of the PUF
concept. In practice Armknecht et al. define all devices that run any challenge-
response protocol as PUFs.
42 A model of the PUF concept
2.1 Formal definition of “PUF”
In the following we assume Armknecht et al.’s model of a PUF as physical
function PF() (see section 1.2). We break up the physical function PF() into
three steps (see fig.(1)). C,Sr,S and R are bit strings.
1. In the first “physical read-out” step PF1 = Sr, internal information Sr (the
“raw secret”) is physically read-out from the PUF in response to a challenge
C foreseen by the system architecture.
2. In an optional second step PF2(Sr) = S error correction and/or privacy
amplification are performed, such that errors in the read-out are corrected
and parts of Sr which may be known by the attacker (e.g. by guessing parts
of the challenge) are removed by privacy amplification algorithms.
3. In an optional third step PF3(S) = R, some additional algorithm is performed
with S as input to calculate the final response R. Typically PF3 is some
cryptographic protocol that proves the possession of S without disclosing it.
In many existing PUF architectures the challenge C is an address of information
inside the PUF which is output as the response R. E.g. in arbiter PUFs[11] C
defines the choice of a set of delay switches whose cumulative delay path defines
S (and from this R). Our idea is that the possibility for this mode of addressing,
rather than its “unclonability”, defines a PUF. The challenge C can then be
understood as a key required for physical access to the response R. R remains
secret without access to C.
A security architecture based on this idea requires certain properties of PF()
which define the PUF concept:
– Formal Definition 1 of a PUF A hardware device is called “PUF” if:
a. a physical function PF2(PF1()) which is deterministic for a specific set of
challenges M, can be evaluated with each challenge at least once and
b. the value S = PF2(PF1(C)) changes with its argument, for all outside
challenges C ∈ M, i.e. PF2(PF1(C)) = S is not a constant function.
One difference to some previous PUF definitions is that PF() is not required to
be easily evaluatable. An efficient evaluation of S is certainly a desirable design
goal, but there is no reason why a device with inefficient read out cannot be a
PUF by definition.
Another difference to most previous definitions is that it allows a PUF to be
clonable. As an example consider the following physical function that fulfills the
above definition 1:
– PF1(any C with more 1s than 0s) = 1001101101
– PF1(any C with more 0s than 1s or equal number of 1s and 0s) = 0001101000
Clearly a PUF with this PF1 can be reproduced by a trivial algorithm, i.e. it is
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Fig. 1. Symbolic model of a PUF The box delineates the PUF that receives
a challenge C (shown with an example bit string) and sends a response R that is
determined in three distinct steps. The first step is the physical readout, the second
the correction of errors that can occur in the first step and the third step includes all
operations of mathematical cryptography.
PUFs” do exist in the real world and should not present a PUF definition with
a paradox. “Unclonability” is then a property that is aimed for, rather than
achieved by definition. Analogously “cryptography” aims for secrecy (crypto)
rather than achieving it by definition. Even though it is a child’s game to break
it, the Cesar cipher is a valid cryptographical algorithm according to this defini-
tion. Consequently cryptographic algorithms are commonly defined to be “key-
dependent injective” (rather than “unbreakable”) mappings”[20].
Where does this leave PUF security? It is not possible in principle to extract
the secret S from a PUF without knowing of the challenge. This is true even for
the above insecure PUF. However in the example above it is easy to reproduce
PF1, and therefore, as soon as the challenge becomes known, S becomes known.
Therefore the crucial necessary objective for the security of a PUF is the unclon-
ability of PF2(PF1()). In the next section we make this insight more precise. A
complete and quantitative set of security requirements (i.e. with requirements on
their length ℓ, the number of independent challenges N etc.) can only be made
in the context of a concrete PUF architecture. One example is discussed further
in section 5.1.
2.2 Security of a PUF
Requirements for prediction Even though the response of a PUF can in
principle be used for various purposes, we will conclude in section 6 that one
central PUF capability is the distribution of remote authentication secrets. If S
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it, i.e. a partial prediction of S=PF2(PF1(C)) for a given argument C will not
be considered a successful attack in the following. Therefore, the natural “basic
objective” of PUF security is that the attacker cannot predict a complete, correct
bit string S for a given bit string C.
Attack models Security can only be defined relative to an attack model, that
lays down the assumptions about the security environment. We assume in the
following two models from the literature that seem realistic in practice. The first
one models an attempt to break Armknecht et al.’s[1] selective unclonability1.
It does not put any restriction on the attack strategy, therefore adaptive choices
of challenges are possible2. The second one is an attempt to do the same with a
certain reasonable amount of insider knowledge. Both models assume that the
attacker has only access to one single PUF, i.e. attacks exploiting correlations
between different PFs are excluded by assumption (see Armknecht et al.[1] for
the general case).
Attack model 1: “Outsider attack”: The attacker has physical access only to the
attacked PUF only for a finite amount of time ∆ta. After this access period, she
tries to predict a secret S from the PUF to a challenge C, randomly chosen from
the set of all challenges. She has no knowledge of the set of challenges and secrets
that will be used during the active lifetime of the PUF or any further previous
knowledge of the PUF.
Attack model 2: “Insider attack”: The attacker has physical access only to the
attacked PUF only for a finite amount of time ∆ta. After this access period she
tries to predict a secret S from the PUF to a challenge C, randomly chosen from
the set of all challenges. She has no knowledge of the set of challenges and se-
crets that will be used during the active lifetime of the PUF but she has all other
information that the manufacturer of the PUF has about the attacked individual
PUF.
The attack models assume that the attacker tries to predict S rather than R,
1 Ru¨hrmair et al.’s[15] PUF definition demanded that the original manufacturer of
the PUF cannot produce two PUFs which are clones of each other (Armknecht
et al.[1] demand this “existential unclonabiliy” only optionally.). “Selectively
unclonability”[1] means that given physical access to the device an attacker can-
not produce a clone.
In practice existential unclonability would hardly enhance the security against a ma-
licious manufacturer, for the following reason. She could produce “quasi-existential-
PUF” devices that do not meet the PUF definition 1, but algorithmically simulate -
e.g. with an keyed hash function - an output that cannot be discriminated from the
one of an existential PUF. These quasi-existential-PUFs could be easily cloned by
the malicious manufacturer, and could serve exactly the same purpose as clonable
PUFs.
As an alternative to existential unclonability we will propose a weaker “resistance-
against-insider-attacks” security level in this section 2.2.
2 Therefore strong unpredictability in the sense of Armknecht et al.[1] will be necessary
to protect the PUF.
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secure tamper-resistance scheme in combination with a secure crypto algorithm.
Such a security mechanism shall remain out of our consideration because we aim
to define the security of the PUF itself.
Security against a model-2 attacker corresponds to unclonability against an at-
tacker who has most of the inside knowledge about the PUF production, but who
cannot directly manipulate the production process. This unclonability is weaker
than “existential unclonability” (see footnote 1) but perhaps more relevant in
practice.
Definition of a secure PUF The PUF-security definition now follows from
the requirement that the attack shall be unsuccessful:
– Formal definition 2 of the PUF-security objective
A PUF is secure against an attack of a model-1 (“selectively unclonable”)
attacker if a model-1 attacker can compute or physically copy the func-
tion PF2(PF1(C)) = S for not more than a negligible fraction L of chal-
lenges from the set of all possible challenges. Here “compute” means via
a computation independent of the PUF and corresponds to “mathematical
cloning”. “Physically copy” means to create a device that functionally repro-
duces PF2(PF1(C)) and corresponds to “physical cloning”.
Replacing the model-1 by a model-2 attacker defines a PUF that is “insider
selectively unclonable”. L is the security level of a secure PUF, i.e. the probability
for an attacker to successfully predict the secret S for a challenge C without being
in posession of the PUF after the access period.
A precise quantification of “negligible”, i.e. the decision which upper limit of
L is required, cannot be made on the level of this general definition because it
depends on the detailed security environment. L is analogous to the required
probability p of a successful brute force attack in classical cryptography that
depends on the key length. We propose as a reasonable upper limit on L that it
is “negligible on a terrestrial scale” which has been estimated by Emile Borel as
< 10−15[4].
3 Relation of PUFs to closely related concepts
In this section we delineate the concept of a PUF as defined in section 2.1 and
2.2 from five closely related concepts.
3.1 PUFs and conventional unclonable functions (“CUFs”) are
qualitatively different
Let us first differentiate between a PUF and a conventional physical function that
serves the same function as a PUF (called “conventional unclonable function”
CUF in the following). A CUF contains secret information that is protected
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and by a cryptographic algorithm that protects the secret from disclosure via the
response. A CUF does not fulfill the PUF definition 1., because the secret does
not depend on the challenge. In other words: The first physical secret readout
step PF1(C) is a constant function in a CUF.
PUF and CUF differ qualitatively in the way they protect the secret. In a PUF
the lack of knowledge of the challenges protects the secret S in a similar sense
that the lack of knowledge of a cryptographical key protects the clear text in
a cipher text. There is no analogous “key” in a CUF. Its security mechanisms
merely rely on physical barriers and arrangements that prevent access to secret
information.
3.2 PUFs and physically obfuscated keys are independent concepts
Devices that extract physical information with “non-standard” methods are cur-
rently called PUF even if there is no (or effectively a single fixed internal) chal-
lenge (e.g. in SRAM PUFs[10]). In this case PF1() is formally constant, so that
such devices are no PUFs in the sense of our definition 1. We endorse Ru¨hrmair
et al.’s suggestion[15] to call information extracted in this way in general “phys-
ically obfuscated keys” (POKs). This limit of N=1 is the only one where devices
that are currently called PUFs, would no longer be classified as PUF under our
proposed definition. We find this appropriate because while POKs can enable
valuable tamper-resistance mechanisms (see below), they are not the qualita-
tively novel primitive of physical cryptography that PUFs promise to be (see
section 6 for further discussion of the nature of this primitive).
The protection by obfuscation is valuable: it consists in the extra-time an at-
tacker needs to learn the non-standard readout mechanism or position in a stan-
dard memory where an obfuscated key has to be stored at least temporarily.
POKs are delineated from CUF only by the “non-standard” qualifier because
stored information is always physical[12]. The secrets of PUFs will usually be
stored in a non-standard way, i.e. they will also be POKs. But this is no neces-
sary requirement for a PUF. There is no fundamental reason why PUFs cannot
have “standard” computer memories (see e.g. SHICs[17], a PUF using a stan-
dard crossbar memory).
Physically obfuscated functions (POFs) may also appear in PUF architectures.
They are defined as computation with non-standard physical processes, e.g. via
scattering of light or folding of proteins.
3.3 Random number generators
In both deterministic and physical random number generators the initial read-
out step PF1 (the read out of the seed) does not depend on a challenge C.
In secure deterministic RNGs PF1(C) must be a constant function. In physi-
cal RNGs PF1 is not constant but intrinsically random, i.e. not deterministic.
Therefore, RNGs do not meet the PUF definition 1.
93.4 Controlled PUFs: a PUF with additional tamper resistance
In controlled PUFs[7,9] tamper-resistance measures prevent the attacker from
obtaining C – Sr pairs from the PUF. Only the C – R pairs - from which Sr
cannot be derived if PF3 is a suitable, secure cryptographical algorithm - can be
accessed by an attacker. It seems likely that PUFs e.g. used in smart cards will
eventually all be controlled PUFs, because such an additional well understood
security layer stands to reason. However the security of PUFs themselves should
be analysed under the assumption of no such a control because if one trusts the
control mechanism, mathematically clonable PUFs suffice anyway.
3.5 “Strong PUFs”: not the only path to strength
Ru¨hrmair et al.[15] defined a PUF to be “strong” if it “has so many C – R pairs
... that an attack ... based on exhaustively measuring the C – R pairs has a
negligible probability of success”. In our nomenclature a strong PUF is roughly
a MRT-PUF that fulfills our second security requirement (see section 5.1 below,
for further explanation of MRT). It is thus appropriate to call them ”strong“,
but there can be secure PUFs which are not “strong” in Ru¨hrmair et al.’s sense,
e.g. EUR-PUFs(see section 5.2 below for further explanation of EUR).
4 Security evaluation of PUFs
A main purpose of the present proposed formal PUF definitions 1. and 2. of the
concept “secure PUF” is to establish a consistent basis for security evaluations
and certifications of PUFs. What is the structure of an evaluation on this basis?
If the proposed PUF fulfills definition 1, the basic informal questions of a security
evaluation based on definition 2 are:
1. Which form has PF1(C) and by which physical mechanism is Sr extracted?
2. What is the form of PF2(Sr)=S and how is the function evaluated physically?
3. What is the total information content in the set of all secrets S?
4. For what fraction L of the allowed challenges can PF2(PF1(C)) be either
mathematically computed or physically copied?
5. Which comprehensible physical security mechanisms prevent an attacker to
compute or copy PF2(PF1(C)) for more than a fraction L of all challenges?
Answers to questions 1. - 4. allow to evaluate quantitative and comprehensible
security levels against “mathematical-cloning brute force attacks” (see section
5). Question 5 will have a more qualitative answer, similar to answers to the
question whether a mathematical cryptographic algorithm is secure against non-
brute force attacks.
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5 Analysis of PUF security mechanisms
The holy grail of PUF construction is to construct PUFs that are unclonable i.e.
fulfill the security definition 2 (section 2.2). If an attacker succeeds to access the
PUF’s internal secrets, she will usually be able to compute PF2. Because physical
reproduction of a PUF without knowledge of its internal secrets will probably be
hard in practice3, PUF security mechanisms must above all prevent the attacker
from computing PF2. In other words: mathematical unclonability is the hardest
nut. Therefore we will classify the known PUF security mechanism and calculate
their security level against brute-force mathematical cloning attacks.
Up to now all proposed and constructed PUFs4 are based on a mechanism that
we propose to call “minimum readout time”(MRT) and that is further discussed
in subsection 5.1. All these existing PUFs turn out to fulfill our PUF-definition
1, i.e. they “remain” PUFs, even in case they have turned out to be clonable (see
below). Because currently the MRT mechanism dominates the field, one might
be tempted to equate the very concept of PUFs with it. However, the flexibility
of our definition allows a completely different PUF security mechanism that we
call “erasure upon read-out”(EUR) (see section 5.2) for devices. One concrete
EUR PUF, the quantum PUF will be introduced below.
These examples show that our proposed definitions have achieved their aims:
nearly all existing (MRT) PUFs can be included in its scope, but its flexibility
allows to include completely novel PUF constructions (the EUR PUFs).
5.1 “Minimum readout time” PUFs
This well known PUF security mechanism is to store a large enough number N
of C – S pairs on the PUF so that the total time
∆tt = ∆tr ×N (1)
to read them all out is much longer than the time ∆ta during which an attacker
possesses the PUF. ∆tr is the read-out time for one C – S pair. The maximal
fraction of pairs the attacker can read-out is then ∆ta/∆tt = Lbf . Lbf is the
security level against mathematical-cloning brute force attacks.
Pappu’s optical PUF[14], the arbiter PUF[8] and nearly all other current PUFs
are MRT-PUFs5. These constructions are valid PUFs according to our definition
because their values of PF2 changes with the challenge.
However, many of the existing PUFs are insecure according to our definition
because Ru¨hrmair et al.[16] succeeded to employ machine-learning methods that
allow to infer PF2(PF1()) from a small fraction of all C – R for which only
short ∆ta is necessary[16]. Because all C – S pairs can be thus predicted, the
3 But not necessarily impossible. She could e.g. succeed to reproduce to clone a PUF
exactly copying its production process.
4 In the sense of this paper, i.e. excluding POKs.
5 The only exception are “PUFs” with only one challenge which we propose to call
only “POKs” in the future, see section 3.2.
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security level against machine-learning attacks Lml = 1 which is “not negligible”
in general, i.e. the PUF must be considered mathematically clonable according
to PUF-security definition 2.
The exact form of PF() depends on the detailed architecture of the MRT PUF.
In general MRT PUFs can be hardened against mathematical cloning if their
PF2(PF1) fulfills the following demands:
Security requirements for the MRT-PUF
– N must satisfy: N ≥ L−1(∆ta/∆tr)
– Suppose PF2(PF1(Cn)) = Sn with n = 1...N where both Cn and Sn contain
ℓ bits. Then the combined information content (entropy) I of all Cn and Sn
must satisfy: I ≥ 2 N ℓ
– The set of challenges to be used in operation must not be contained in any
form in the PUF.
– The lengths of the challenge ℓ and response ℓS must both fulfill: ℓ,ℓS ≥
log2(N).
The first condition expresses that to prevent brute force mathematical-cloning
attacks the number of stored C – R pairs N must be extremely large if L =
10−15, (see section 2.2 on the choice of L). With representative values of ∆ta =
1 day and ∆tr = 1 second the required N would be on the order of 10
20 which is
exponentially larger than e.g. storable in common data storage devices of much
larger size than a typical PUF. This is the sense in which a secure MRT-PUF
requires the storage of an “exponentially large” secret. The second condition
expresses that in order to reliably ward successful machine-learning attacks PF2
must be just an ordered list of C – S pairs with random values that cannot
be represented in any more compact form. The third requirement prevents an
attack in which only the set of challenges to be used in the field operation of a
PUF (which is much smaller than M in secure MRT PUFs) are extracted in an
attack. The fourth constraint is necessary to avoid a decrease in the the effective
L.
5.2 “Erasure Upon Readout” PUFs – Quantum PUFs
Consider a PUF with only a single C – S pair foreseen by the system architecture.
Because there is at least one other non-foreseen C, there are then at least two
possible C. A novel PUF security mechanism requires the following:
Security requirements for “Erasure Upon Readout” (EUR) PUF
– The correct S is returned if the challenge C is correct (i.e. the one foreseen
by the PUF’s architecture) and S is erased and returns a random value if it
is not.
– The length of the challenge ℓ and response ℓS must both fulfill ℓ,ℓS ≥ log2(1/L).
– The set of challenges to be used in operation must not be contained in any
form in the PUF.
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EUR PUFs can fulfill the PUF-definition 1 if they are non-constant PFs that
are deterministic for the foreseen set of challenges. For EUR PUFs - completely
opposite to the MRT case (see section 5.1) - the total number of challenges “N”
can remain as small as 2 but still be secure because by way of the second and
third security requirement the probability to guess the correct challenge is only
L and challenging with the wrong challenge will erase S by the first requirement.
N can be chosen to as many different challenges as are actually needed during
the practical deployment of the PUFs.
The only concrete “Erasure Upon Readout” architecture proposed up to now,
is Wiesner’s “quantum money” and “quantum unforgeable subway token”[21,3]
that can be described as an electronic hardware device running a challenge -
response protocol (such a kind of “money” or “token” has to be) and that fulfill
our definition 1 of a PUF. In such a “quantum-PUF” the secret information
consists of ℓ quantum-mechanical two-state systems (“qubits”) that are prepared
either in one of the two quantum mechanical so called “Fock” states |0〉 or |1〉
(base # 0) or in either one of the states 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) or 1√
2
(|0〉 - |1〉) (base # 1).
|0〉 and 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) encode a “0” secret bit and |1〉 and 1√
2
(|0〉 - |1〉) encode a
“1” secret bit. The challenge bits indicate the correct chosen measurement bases.
The raw secret Sr is encoded with the choice of the state within a chosen basis
according to the rule stated above.
In order to decode or copy Sr, it is necessary to know in which of the two bases #
0 or # 1 the ℓ qubits for one challenge were prepared. If a qubit is read out in a
wrong base, the laws of quantum mechanics determine that the read-out result is
a perfect random number and additional read out attempts will again yield this
random number, rather than the original, correct number. The physical function
PF of the quantum-PUF is thus given as:
Quantum-EUR PF1():
– First read-out:
PF1(correct base bit) = correct bit of Sr
PF1(incorrect base bit) = random bit.
– Any further read-out in the same base:
PF1() = same bit as in first read-out
Evidently in the first read-out PF1 is not constant and deterministic for the fore-
seen C i.e. a quantum-PUF fulfills definition 1. Reading out a C – S pair more
than once is possible, but after the first read-out, the information is no longer
secure because the qubits are no longer in a quantum-mechanical superposition
of states.
In the most simple case without any read-out errors or inefficiencies (so that
no further processing is done PF2(Sr)= Sr) and implementation mistakes (an
assumption that will be difficult to fulfill [18]) the only potentially successful
attack is to guess the challenge. On average, for half of the bits the guess will
be correct and the correct corresponding bits of Sr will be output. For the other
half the probability to get the correct output bit is 1/2. The total probability





the absolute (i.e. not only mathematical-cloning brute force) security level of a
quantum-PUF against this attack. E.g. with a secret Sr consisting of 128 qubits,
L < 10−15 thus fulfilling the criterion for a secure PUF with Borel’s estimate for
an upper bound on L (see section 2.2). Wiesner’s quantum money, interpreted
as a “quantum PUF”, thus proves that an absolutely unclonable PUF is not in
contradiction to the laws of physics.
The use of quantum-PUFs for authentication is beyond the reach of current
technology because qubits are unavoidably read out on very short timescales
(presently qubits cannot be isolated for longer than milliseconds[6]) by interac-
tions with their environment. As explained above, quantum-PUFs are no longer
secure after read-out. Quantum cryptography[18] can be described as sending a
quantum-PUF in the form of a chain of photons in order to distribute its secret S
for use as cryptographic key. In the laboratory such a “light-field” PUF remains
in the initially prepared coherent state for no longer than about a millisecond.
6 Discussion
The protection of secrets in hardware devices that need to access these secrets
in their normal operation - a necessary condition for any authentication pro-
cedure - cannot be implemented with methods of mathematical cryptography
alone. Some physical protection mechanism is needed. The conventional tamper
resistance mechanisms (employed in CUFs see section 3.1) rely on protecting
the memory with physical barriers. CUFs withstand known, vigorous direct at-
tacks typically for not longer than a few months[19]. We showed that PUFs are
a qualitatively novel alternative. The secret is protected by the absence of infor-
mation from the device of where of where the challenge is stored. In CUFs and
POKs this information must exist on the device because otherwise the response
cannot be evaluated, even if it is protected by direct, physical barriers. Thereby
PUFs protect the secret by a novel genuine primitive of physical cryptography.
The possibility of realizing PUFs based on the principles of quantum mechanics
demonstrates that in principle the laws of physics allow to construct absolutely
secure PUFs. This situation motivates more security-related physics research
on unclonable quantum-PUF and MRT-PUF, to invent entirely new PUF con-
struction principles. The real PUF promise are PUFs that withstand any known,
practical attack, period, i.e. provide a level of authenticity protection similar to
the one provided by mathematical cryptography for confidentiality.
In the future PUFs will probably authenticate hardware devices. If Alice knows
the C – Sr pairs of a PUF she gave to Bob (e.g. from the designer of the PUF)
she can publicly broadcast a challenge and be sure that the correct response S
can only be created on Bob’s original PUF. Therefore effectively PUFs allow the
remote distribution of authenticated secret entropy (the S for Bob) via sending
the challenges (the C chosen and sent by Alice) over standard channels. These
entropy could “update” the secrets in conventional unclonable functions. In this
way existing architectures based on CUFs could be augmented by PUFs without
the need for a completely new PUF security architecture.
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